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The renaissance of studies of class in post-apartheid South Africa has not produced 
any certainty as to the optimal delineation of classes in empirical analysis.  This 
paper uses data from a 2005 survey in Cape Town to examine the relationships 
between occupational (or objective) class, self-reported (or subjective) class, race, 
neighbourhood income and household income. Cape Town is not an industrial city, 
and thus has small working classes, but (like all South African cities) it does have 
high unemployment.  There are clear relationships between race, education and 
occupational class (unsurprisingly, given the history of apartheid). The 
relationships between occupational class, incomes and self-reported class are less 
clear.  The paper concludes with a preliminary analysis of some of the possible 
consequences of class, in terms of perceptions of the social structure and of 
government policy, and of racial identities and attitudes. 
 
 
The promising future of class analysis in South 
Africa 
 
In the late apartheid period class was the dominant concept in South African social 
science.  Most of the research using class examined its consequences, using class 
analysis in a loose way to explain broader political conflict and change.  Some of 
this research was highly structuralist (and often functionalist), focusing on the 
broad dynamics of capitalism and its supposed consequences for governance.  Most 
focused, however, on the nuances of organization, protest and consciousness at the 
local level, examining how the major changes in the political economy transformed 
the lives of ordinary people, and how they in turn responded, shaping broader 
processes of change.  Reviews of South African history and social science in the 
1970s and 1980s typically focus on the contrast – and intermittent conflict – 







Despite the hegemony of class analysis (in its different forms) in the 1970s and 
1980s, there was little systematic, empirical research on class, i.e. into the size and 
shape of the class structure, the foundations of class in the South African context, 
or the relationship between class and culture.  Earlier attempts to map the class 
structure were bedevilled primarily by their reliance on the very poor data available 
in population censuses (Davies, 1973, 1979; Wolpe, 1977).  Crankshaw’s careful 
analysis (1997) of data from manpower surveys allowed an incisive analysis of 
aspects of the occupational class structure in the mid-apartheid period, but the data 
excluded major occupations and did not permit an analysis of households.  Class 
analysis was constructed out of qualitative research, including studies of specific 
episodes of resistance and even individuals’ life narratives.  This meant that South 
African class analysis had a deep appreciation of the kinds of issues embraced 
within Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’, including especially the complex dynamics 
between race, gender and class.  But it had little understanding of the class structure 
of South Africa, or of the aggregate class categories that are useful or appropriate in 
the study of South African society in the late Twentieth Century. 
 
Concern with class fell out of the intellectual tool-kit of South African social 
scientists very quickly once negotiations began, in the early 1990s, over the precise 
form of the new constitutional democracy. This was not because scholars 
demonstrated the irrelevance of class in a democratic South Africa.  Social, 
economic and political life in other capitalist democracies demands class analysis 
no less than life in undemocratic capitalist countries.  If this was not the case, then 
class analysis – whether Marxist or non-Marxist – would not have survived the 
adoption of a universal adult franchise in the advanced capitalist countries of the 
global North in the early twentieth century. Rather, it seems to reflect the 
difficulties of reconciling a critical, class-oriented analysis with the new emphasis 
among ‘progressive’ scholars with public policy-making.   
 
In the early 2000s, however, there are signs of a revival of interest in class analysis.  
This has been fuelled by two developments.  First, from mid-1990s, household 
survey data has become readily available, allowing more comprehensive analyses 
of class.1  In Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa, written with Nicoli 
Nattrass, I analysed the South African class structure at the end of apartheid, using 
data from a 1993 household survey (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005).  One of our 
concerns in the book was to analyse social stratification within the African 
population.  An aspect of this is the size and growth of the African ‘middle classes’, 
which has attracted attention from other scholars also (Schlemmer, 2005; Muller, 
                                                 





2006a, 2006b).  Peter Alexander and colleagues at the University of Johannesburg 
are currently conducting innovative research in Soweto, combining quantitative and 
qualitative data.   
 
The empirical study of class in South Africa might still be in its infancy, but it has 
the availability of a strong empirical base means that class analysis has a 
‘promising future’ (as Goldthorpe famously remarked, about the advanced 
capitalist societies of the global North). What makes the future of class analysis in 
South Africa especially promising is that the new possibilities of empirical class 
analysis can be combined with a rich tradition of historical and sociological work 
on ‘habitus’. This means that South African scholarship has the potential to escape 
the confines of ‘Northern’ class analysis – i.e. the traditions of class analysis 
derived from the study of, principally, Britain (where industrial capitalism first 
emerged on a large scale) or, to a lesser extent, North-West Europe and North 
America.  As South African historians have long known, processes of class 
formation in Southern Africa – i.e. the making of the Southern African ‘working 
classes’ (and other classes) – have been very different to the world portrayed by 
E.P.Thompson and others for late eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain. 
 
Identifying the relevant categories for mapping class in a society like South Africa 
is no easy process, and will require a mix of qualitative and quantitative research.  
This paper does not do this, and thus entails a limited contribution to this project.  
What this paper does is use a new quantitative dataset from Cape Town to begin to 
examine the relationships between occupational (or what might be called objective) 
class, self-reported (or subjective) class, income (at both household and 
neighbourhood levels), and race.   
 
It builds on the ‘objective’ class schema set out in Class, Race and Inequality.  This 
class schema distinguishes not only between the owners (or managers) of capital 
and the rest of the working population, but also between different sections of the 
non-capitalist working population, and between classes defined by their access to 
the labour market and an underclass defined by its systematic exclusion from it.  
Our ten-class schema (which could be reduced to three clusters of classes, see 
Figure 1) was provisional.  It satisfied weak versions of the tests of ‘internal’ (or 
criterion) validity (i.e. it has coherent theoretical foundations) and ‘external’ (or 
‘construct’) validity (i.e. it has observable consequences) (see Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005: ch.7).   But the schema would need to satisfy stronger tests of both 









Figure 1: The Class Structure of South Africa 
 
 
Studies of the South African ‘middle class’ offer competing understandings of what 
counts as ‘middle class’ in the South African context.  Schlemmer (2005) applies 
an American conception of the ‘middle class’, but tailored for the South African 
context.  He identifies the ‘middle class’ on the basis of education, occupation and 
‘LSM’, i.e. the composite measure of income and household assets that is used in 
the advertising industry’s All Media Product Survey (AMPS).  His is a very 
restricted definition of a ‘middle class’, including only about 6 percent of all 
working people.  He excludes households (or ‘families’, as he writes) who are not 
in LSMs 9 and 10, and thus had (in 2003) incomes below R12,000 p.a..  Although 
they might not be poor,  
 
‘they have constrained household budgets, their discretionary 
spending is limited, and they have to expose themselves to 
considerable debt in order to acquire the accoutrements of a middle-
class lifestyle.  They are marginal to the core of the middle class and 
hence this study excludes them.  They are a sociologically distinct 
“lower middle” class.’ (ibid: 118)   
 
Teachers, for example, are thereby excluded from Schlemmer’s ‘middle class’.  
Muller (2006a, 2006b), in contrast, uses a more expansive concept of the middle 
class, divided into an upper middle class (comprising technicians and associate 
professionals such as teachers and nurses) and a lower middle class (of clerks and 
artisans).  Whereas Schlemmer’s middle class is really the elite, Muller’s middle 





senior officials and professionals – and the working classes.  Muller’s middle class 
is much larger and less affluent than Schlemmer’s. 
 
The contrast between Schlemmer and Muller highlights the important point that 
there is no unique and clearly ‘correct’ class schema for South Africa.  Much more 
work needs to be done on the strengths and weaknesses of alternative schema. 
 
This paper begins to explore aspects of class in one South African city, Cape Town.  
It uses data from the 2005 Cape Area Study (CAS).  This survey covered aspects of 
diversity and inequality.  It was designed as both part of an ongoing study of Cape 
Town (that includes a series of surveys) and part of an international, multi-city 
study of aspects of urban life.  The 2005 CAS was funded by the Andrew W. 
Mellon Foundation as part of its grant to establish the Centre for Social Science 
Research at the University of Cape Town.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted 
with a representative sample of about 1200 individuals in 65 enumeration areas.  
Fieldwork was conducted in African areas by a UCT-based team of Xhosa-
speaking fieldworkers and in coloured and white areas by Citizen Surveys.  
Interviews were conducted in the interviewees’ preferred language.  As with 
(probably) all surveys in South Africa, the sample in richer neighbourhoods, i.e. 
comprising mostly white people, cannot be considered to be reliably representative, 
because of low access and response rates (see further Seekings et al., 2005). 
 
 
Class in Cape Town 
 
The city of Cape Town is not typical of South Africa as a whole in terms of its 
social structure.  It is most obviously distinctive in terms of its racial composition 
and cultural character.  Not only do African people comprise a minority of the 
city’s population, but until recently they comprised a tiny minority.  As recently as 
the 1970s, 90 percent of Cape Town’s population was white or coloured.  Given the 
cultural differences between white and coloured people, on the one hand, and 
African people, on the other, Cape Town has a distinctive cultural character. 
 
The social structure of Cape Town is not the same as that of South Africa as a 
whole.  Cape Town’s poor are not poor in national terms.  Nor are all of the classes 
identified in Figure 1 present in similar proportions in Cape Town, as we shall see 
further below. Cape Town also has a markedly different racial and cultural 
structure to the rest of the country, and there is a distinctive and substantial overlap 





minority is overwhelmingly affluent, although the coloured population spans the 
range from poor to rich.  This makes it difficult often to distinguish between the 
effects of race and class. 
 
Our analysis of class in Cape Town remains very preliminary.  Data from the 2005 
Cape Area Study (CAS) allows for the classification of households, but so far we 
have only coded the data for respondents themselves, not for other members of 
their households.  This means that we have ‘direct’ class positions for some of our 
respondents – i.e. those respondents who are in the labour force, and have 
occupations or are unemployed – but not ‘mediated’ class positions for the others 
(or for those respondents who do work or are unemployed, but are not the 
breadwinners in their households).  Our measure of class is thus a measure of 
individual occupational class, with little attention to property and no measure of the 
systematic disadvantage entailed in the concept of the underclass.   
 
Table 1: Occupational Classes of Respondents in CAS 2005 Sample 
Class % of working 
people 
% of people in 
the labour force 
% of total 
Upper class (UC) 16 11 8 
Semi-professional class (SPS) 8 5 4 
Intermediate class (IC) 44 31 22 
Core working class (CWC) 18 13 9 
Small businesses (WE3) 4 3 2 
Marginal working class (MWC) 10 7 5 
Unemployed  29 21 
Not in labour force   30 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: CAS 2005, weighted data 
 
Table 1 shows the individual occupational classes of CAS respondents as 
proportions of working people, of all people in the labour force (i.e. excluding 
students, the retired and ‘housewives’ who are neither in nor want paid 
employment), and of the total sample.  If our sample is representative, then Cape 
Town has a large upper class and intermediate class, and small core and marginal 
working classes.  This is not surprising, given the weakness of the industrial sectors 






Table 2 shows some of the characteristics of the larger occupational classes.  
Unsurprisingly, white people predominate in the upper class.  Coloured people 
form one half of the semi-professional, intermediate and core working classes – i.e. 
almost in exact proportion to their share of the population as a whole.  African 
people feature disproportionately in the ranks of the marginal working class and 
unemployed. Women are more common in the semi-professional class (teachers 
and nurses) and the marginal working class (domestic workers).  There is also a 
clear relationship between education and class. 
 
Table 2: Selected characteristics of CAS realized sample in each major 
class, using weighted data 













African 3 12 17 37 62 53 
Coloured 32 49 49 48 32 39 
White 58 32 30 3 2 5 




Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Male 66 41 59 62 22 41 
Female 34 59 42 37 76 59 
 
Gender 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Not passed matric 10 9 44 65 84 73 
Passed matric 90 91 56 35 16 27 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Education 
Of which: Some 
post-matric 
education 
74 66 30 14 4 15 
Note: Unemployed uses the broad definition, i.e. including non-searchers.  Race is defined using 
apartheid-era classification; other includes Indian, ‘other’, ‘refused’ and ‘don’t know’. 
 
Individual occupational class and household class will differ if the individual is not 
the breadwinner in the household and the breadwinner is in a different individual 
occupational class.  We do know that three-quarters of the respondents who were, 
individually, in the upper class, semi-professional class, intermediate class and core 
working class, were the breadwinners in their households, so we know that there is 





of these cases.  The proportion was lower among those people who were, 
individually, in the marginal working class, and among the unemployed it was less 
than one half.  Many of the unemployed are not, therefore, members of the 
underclass, but are rather the unemployed, direct (i.e. co-resident) dependents of 
working people.  
 
Neighbourhood income is an alternative measure of class, given that the advantages 
of higher class generally convert into both the capacity and the ambition to live in 
richer neighbourhoods.  Neighbourhood income will be an unsatisfactory proxy for 
class in cases where neighbourhoods are heterogeneous in terms of their class 
composition (and probably therefore also in terms of income distribution).  Whilst 
it is unlikely that manual labourers will be living in the same neighbourhoods as 
lawyers and managers, it is likely that there will be unemployed people – and even 
households in which no one is employed – in the same neighbourhoods as working-
class and even perhaps middle class households.  
 
Neighbourhood income is calculated on the basis of data on household incomes 
from the 2001 Population Census, at the level of the local government ward.  Cape 
Town comprised, at that time, precisely one hundred wards.  For each ward, the 
Population Census data can be used to calculate a mean household income.  These 
means are then used in the analysis of data on political attitudes and behaviour 
from the 2005 CAS.  This raises two further problems.  First, relative incomes 
might have changed between 2001 and 2005.  Secondly, the sampling units – or 
enumeration areas – used for CAS were much smaller than the wards for which we 
have mean household income data.  On average, each ward comprises about fifty 
enumeration areas, so that it is possible that the mean household income in a ward 
is different to the mean household income in any particular enumeration area.  CAS 
did ask about individual earnings and household incomes, but these data are also 
yet to be cleaned thoroughly, and in any case should be viewed with some caution. 
 
The neighbourhoods included in the CAS sample can be divided into five 
neighbourhood income quintiles, using the Population Census data.  Table 3 sets 
out some key characteristics of each quintile.  Whilst (at least) 77 percent of the 
poorest quintile are African (or, to be more precise, report that they were or would 
have been classified as African under apartheid), only about 10 percent of the third, 
fourth and fifth quintiles are African. Conversely, almost no one in the three 
poorest quintiles was white. White people were concentrated in the two richest 
quintiles. Coloured people were spread across the entire range of income quintiles, 






There are also clear differences between the neighbourhood income quintiles in 
terms of education levels and labour market status.  In the poorest quintile, three 
out of four adults interviewed had not passed matric.  In the richest quintile, the 
proportion was just 20 percent (and this might include some young men and 
women who are still in school).  In the CAS sample, there were more unemployed 
than working adults in the poorest quintile, but in the richest quintile there were 






Table 3: Selected characteristics of CAS realized sample in each 
neighbourhood income quintile, using weighted data 














African 77 40 10 9 11 31 
Coloured 15 54 83 60 7 42 
White 1 0 0 28 76 21 




Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Not passed matric 77 65 66 51 20 57 
Passed matric 23 35 34 49 80 43 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Education 
Of which: Some post-matric 
education 
9 21 21 26 61 27 
Working 35 47 55 58 63 51 
Unemployed  39 27 17 15 7 22 





Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Upper class (UC) <1 2 3 7 22 7 
Semi-professional class 
(SPS) 
<1 4 3 8 5 4 
Intermediate class (IC) 11 19 26 23 20 19 
Core working class (CWC) 8 10 12 8 3 8 
Small businesses (WE3) 4 2 2 <1 2 2 
Marginal working class 
(MWC) 
7 10 3 4 5 6 
Unemployed 37 24 19 15 6 21 







Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: These are statistics on the weighted CAS sample, not of the Cape Town population; 
therefore, for example, the total racial composition above is not identical to the actual racial 
composition of Cape Town, according to census and other data.  Race was defined as how the 
respondent reports he or she was or would have been classified under apartheid; ‘other’ includes 







Table 3 also shows the composition of each neighbourhood income quintile by the 
occupational class of the respondents.  There are a large number of ‘others’ in each 
quintile: these are respondents who neither worked nor were unemployed, i.e. they 
were studying, retired, or were ‘housewives’.  Disregarding these ‘others’, there is 
a weak relationship between neighbourhood income quintile and individual class.  
In the top or richest quintile, three times as many respondents are in the upper class, 
semi-professional class or intermediate class, as are in the working classes or are 
unemployed.  There are many more unemployed in poorer neighbourhoods.  The 
core working class tends to live in middle-income neighbourhoods, whilst the 
marginal working class tends to live in poorer neighbourhoods.  The intermediate 
class is, in Cape Town, a heterogeneous class, living in a wide range of 
neighbourhoods. Table 4 provides examples of an actual household in each 





Figure 2: Race and neighbourhood income quintiles in Cape Town 
 
The Cape Area Study did collect data on individual earnings and household 
incomes, but this data requires additional cleaning before it can be used with 
confidence and precision.  Furthermore, given the difficulties in collating a full 
picture of earnings and income – the South African parastatatal statistics office uses 
a very detailed income and expenditure survey – it is likely that the data will 
remain flawed, even when cleaned.  Neighbourhood-level data might be a better 
measure of a household’s economic position and possibilities because it probably 
reflects wealth as well as current income. 
 
Table 4 shows the relationship between neighbourhood income and self-reported 
household income. Table 4a shows the distribution inclusive of ‘refused’ and ‘don’t 





neighbourhoods (i.e. NIQ 5) report the highest incomes, and household in the 
poorest areas (NIQ 1 and NIQ 2) report the lowest, but there is little difference 
between the third and fourth neighbourhood income quintiles in terms of self-
reported household incomes. 
 
Table 4: Self-reported household income (Rands/month), by 
neighbourhood income quintile 














0 – 1,000 34 21 9 8 0 15 
1,001 – 3,000 40 28 21 16 7 23 
3,001 – 5,000 16 19 23 18 13 18 
5,001 – 10,000 3 8 27 18 20 15 
> 10,000 1 1 5 6 30 8 
refused 2 13 8 25 19 13 
dont know 5 10 7 8 11 8 
Table 4a 
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
0 – 1,000 37 27 11 12 1 19 
1,001 – 3,000 42 36 24 25 10 29 
3,001 – 5,000 17 25 27 27 18 22 
5,001 – 10,000 3 10 32 28 28 19 







total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Numbers can only go so far in representing the groups of real people that comprise 
classes.  Detailed qualitative research is required to go beyond these data on Cape 
Town – or, more precisely, on people in Cape Town.  As a preliminary measure, 
however, individual cases can be extracted from the Cape Area Study to illustrate 
the kinds of people and households that fall into each of these neighbourhood 







Table 5: Examples of households in CAS sample in each 
neighbourhood income quintile 




Sipho Mamase (aged 49) lives in a shack in Philippi together with his 
wife and 5 year-old daughter.  He has grade 6, and helps to deliver milk; 






2A: Eunice Maseko lives with her elderly parents and brother in a brick 
house in Khayelitsha.  She cleans offices; her brother is a security guard; 
both have matric. 
2B: Wayne Plaatjie lives with his wife, two children, and unemployed 
brother in Bonteheuwel.  Wayne’s wife doesn’t work, and he himself has 








3A: Cheryl Julies shares a house in Woodlands (Mitchell’s Plain) with 
her elderly mother, her two children, and her sister.  Her sister is the only 
person working; she is a machinist in a clothing factory. 
3B: Mr and Mrs Abraham live in Macassar, outside the Strand; he works 
in a Pick ‘n’ Pay supermarket, and she is a buyer’s assistant for a chain 







4A: Sandy Jooste lives with her husband and 8 year-old daughter in 
Strandfontein.  She is a teacher, but her husband is unemployed and 
looking for work. 
4B: Archie Solomon is a mechanic, and his wife is a dressmaker.  They 






Dave Reid lives with his wife and 23-year-old daughter in Claremont (in 
Cape Town’s Southern Suburbs).  Dave is an engineer, his wife is an 
accountant, and their daughter is in university.  
 
UC 





Objective and subjective class generally differ: Sociologists employ different 
systems of classification to a country’s people themselves, although the two are 
likely to inform each other.  The interviewees in CAS were asked about their class:  
 
‘People sometimes think of themselves as being in a class.  Would you 
say that you are in the upper class, middle class, working class or lower 
class?  If respondent asks for a definition of class, say that “Class is 





These options are not open-ended: interviewees could not choose to respond 
‘proletarian’, for example.  Nor do these ‘subjective’ options accord with the 
‘objective’ categories employed in our ten-class schema. Our pre-survey tests 
suggested that they were categories with which people felt comfortable.  Indeed, 
only 2 percent of respondents were unable or unwilling to select one of these four 
response options.  It must be noted that respondents were interviewed in their 
homes, not at their workplaces; had they been interviewed at work, they might have 
chosen different responses, i.e. self-reported class might be conditional on the 
context in which the interview takes place.2  
 
Self-reported class is represented in Figure 3. Only a small proportion of 
respondents selected ‘upper class’.  One-third selected ‘middle class’, more than 
four-tenths chose ‘working class’, and the remaining one-quarter chose ‘lower 
class’. 
 




There is a clear but inexact relationship between subjective (or self-perceived) and 
objective class, as we can see in Table 6.  Most people who we classified as upper 
class, on the basis of their individual occupations, classified themselves as either 
upper or middle class.  Most people who we classified as intermediate class, almost 
                                                 
2 This was suggested to me by Peter Alexander, based on his and his colleagues’ research in 





all of those whom we classified as core working class, and most of those whom we 
classified as marginal working class identified themselves as working class.  Most 
unemployed interviewees said that they were lower class.   
 
Table 6: Class and self-reported class (as % of total) 
Self-reported (‘subjective’) class  




Lower class Total 
Upper class (UC) 7 4 0 11 
Semi-professional class (SPC) 2 3 <1 5 
Intermediate class (IC) 11 18 2 31 
Core working class (CWC) 2 9 2 13 
Small businesses (WE3) 1 2 <1 3 
Marginal working class (MWC) <1 5 3 7 
Unemployed 8 6 15 29 
Total 31 47 23 100 
 
There are various reasons why people might identify themselves differently to the 
way that sociologists classify themselves.  First, they might have mediated class 
positions that are different to their individual occupational positions.  One of the 
households described in Table 4 above (household 3A) included a respondent, 
Cheryl Julies, who was herself unemployed.  But because her sister was a 
machinist, Cheryl’s mediated class position would be core working class, even 
though her own individual occupational class was ‘unemployed’.  Similarly, in 
household 4A, had we interviewed Sandy Jooste’s husband, we would have found 
that he was unemployed, but because Sandy is a teacher his mediated class position 
is in the semi-professional class.  Many of our unemployed respondents – perhaps 
more than half – have mediated class positions that placed them in one of the other 
classes. 
 
There is also a clear relationship between neighbourhood income and self-reported 
class, as we can see in Table 7.  People in low-income neighbourhoods are much 
more likely to say that they are lower class, whilst people in the rich 
neighbourhoods are much more likely to say that they are middle or even upper 
class.  Again, the poorest and richest quintiles are very distinctive, but the pattern in 






Table 7: Self-reported class, by neighbourhood income quintile 














Upper class <1 <1 <1 <1 5 2 
Middle class 14 28 31 32 63 33 
Working class 29 42 56 53 28 41 
Lower class 56 29 13 15 4 25 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: CAS 2005, f6; results are exclusive of ‘don’t know’; n=1,171 
 









Upper class 1 1 4 2 
Middle class 13 31 64 33 
Working class 32 51 30 40 
Lower class 54 14 2 24 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 9: Correlates of self-reported class 
 Self-reported middle class Self-reported working class Self-reported lower class 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F 
UC 0.50 (0.06) *** 0.23 (0.09) *** (base) (base) (base) (base) 
SPC 0.23 (0.1) ** 0.06 (0.1) 0.26 (0.08) *** 0.2 (0.1) ** 0.26 (0.08) *** 0.2 (0.1) ** 
IC 0.24 (0.06) *** 0.11 (0.07) * 0.21 (0.06) *** 0.16 (0.07) ** 0.21 (0.06) *** 0.16 (0.07) ** 
CWC (base) (base) 0.3 (0.06) *** 0.25 (0.08) *** 0.3 (0.06) *** 0.25 (0.08) *** 
MWC -0.21 (0.06) ** -0.22 (0.06) ** 0.19 (0.08) ** 0.21 (0.09) ** 0.19 (0.08) ** 0.21 (0.09) ** 
WE3 0.1 (0.12) 0.07 (0.12) 0.18 (0.11) ^ 0.16 (0.12)  0.18 (0.11) ^ 0.16 (0.12) 
Unemployed 0.14 (0.06) ** 0.16 (0.07) ** -0.17 (0.06) *** -0.2 (0.07) *** -0.17 (0.06) *** -0.2 (0.07) *** 
Has matric    0.08 (0.04) *  0.08 (0.04) * 
African       
coloured  0.2 (0.04) ***  0.2 (0.04) ***  0.2 (0.04) *** 
White  0.41 (0.07) ***     
Percentage of residents in 
neighbourhood without matric    0.01 (0.00) ***  0.01 (0.00) *** 
Percentage of residents in 
neighbourhood with matric (only)    0.01 (0.01) **  0.01 (0.01) ** 
Percentage of residents in 
neighbourhood with post-matric 
qualifications 
 0.01 (0.00) ***     
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.18 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.14 
N 792 756 792 751 792 751 
Note: Probit regressions. All variables are dummy variables except for the last three (percentages).  Standard errors in parentheses; significance shown at * 
10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level, and ^ almost 1% level; probit coefficients are marginal effects (dF/dx).  Data are weighted. 
 
African people are far more likely to report that they are ‘lower class’, 
coloured people are more likely to report that they are ‘working class’, and 
white people are much more likely to say that they are ‘middle class’ (see 
Table 8). 
 
The correlates of self-reported class are examined in Table 9.  For each of 
the self-reported middle, working and lower classes, we report two probit 
regressions.  The first probit regression in each pair regresses this subjective 
class against occupational class (all dummy variables). The second 
regression in each pair adds a number of other variables, but only ones that 
are appropriate. Thus, there is no significant correlation between self-
identification as working-class and either neighbourhood income or the 
racial composition of the neighbourhood, so these latter variables are not 
included in Model D. Neither neighbourhood nor household income 
correlate significantly with any of three self-reported class categories. 
 
People are more likely to identify themselves as ‘middle class’ if they have 
an ‘upper class’ or ‘intermediate class’ occupation, and are less likely to do 
so if they are in domestic employment (marginal working class) or are 
unemployed.  Even controlling for occupation, they are more likely to do so 
if they are coloured or (especially) white.  If they live in a neighbourhood 
with many residents with tertiary educational qualifications, they are also 
more likely to identify themselves as middle class (but neighbourhood 
income has no effect).  People are more likely to identify themselves as 
working-class if they are in any occupation except upper class.  This not true 
of people who are self-employed, even in very small businesses, nor of the 
unemployed (who are in fact less likely to see themselves as working class).  
Even controlling for occupation, people with matric and coloured people are 
more likely to see themselves as working-class.  The only neighbourhood-
level variable to correlate significantly with working-class self-identification 
is the educational profile of the neighbourhood. People with tertiary 
qualifications are less likely to identify themselves as working-class.  A very 
similar pattern characterizes self-identification as ‘lower class’. 
 
This is broadly intuitive, except for semi-professionals (i.e. teachers and 
nurses) and the unemployed.  Teachers and nurses appear to tend towards a 
working class identity rather than a middle class identity.  The unemployed 
are very surprising.  This might reflect the fact that the unemployed include 
some well-qualified people, mostly school- and university-leavers, who are 





Further analysis is required into the determinants of whether (or when) 
someone identifies him- or herself as ‘middle class’ rather than ‘working 
class’, or ‘working-class’ rather than ‘lower class’?  Preliminary analysis 
suggests that, among coloured people, neighbourhood income is significant 
in subjective class identification. Further research will hopefully reveal 
whether relative income (i.e. relative to other households in the 
neighbourhood) or relative occupational class (i.e. relative to other 
individuals in the neighbourhood) is an important factor. 
 
A fuller analysis of class needs to go much further than this.  In Class, Race 
and Inequality, I argued that South African had a distinctive ‘underclass’ 
defined in terms of systematic disadvantage.  Lacking skills, qualifications, 
and above all social capital, some of the unemployed are unlikely to get a 
job and are thus confined to chronic poverty.  Social capital is important 
because people get jobs through word of mouth, i.e. through friends and 
family who themselves have jobs and know when vacancies arise, not 
through responding to advertisements in newspapers or in labour agencies.  
Social capital is also important in enabling unemployed people to move to 
areas where there are more jobs.  The underclass was, in the early 1990s, 
primarily rural in character.  The typical member of the underclass was the 
son or daughter of a family of farmworkers evicted off commercial white-
owned farms in the 1970s or 1980s, removed into one of the ‘bantustans’ 
where there was no land and schools were appalling, whose only family 
connections were to the goldmines which – from the 1980s – were cutting 
back drastically on new employment, and who lacked the connections in 
towns even to move to them (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: ch.8).  
Urbanisation has probably increased the urban underclass.  Analysing the 
underclass adequately requires longitudinal data and data on social capital 
(for which data on household composition might be an adequate proxy).  
The Cape Area Study data have not yet been analysed in these ways.  
Language is probably also an important constitutive element in the class 
structure.3  A grasp of English and, to a lesser extent, Afrikaans opens up a 
wide range of opportunities.  A full analysis of the class structure in Cape 
Town requires an analysis of language. 
 
                                                 





Who gets what?  Perceptions of the social 
structure 
 
The Cape Area Study asked a series of questions about the social structure, 
only some of which will be reported in this paper.  Interviewees were asked 
how rich or poor they were, ‘relative to other people in South Africa’, on a 
scale that ran from 0 to 10 where 0 was ‘very poor’, 5 was ‘average’ and 10 
was ‘very rich’.  Despite the fact that incomes in Cape Town are way above 
the national average, only about 20 percent of interviewees said that they 
were above average.  
 
Tables A1 to A3 (in the Appendix) show the relationship between each of 
neighbourhood income, individual occupational class and self-reported class, 
with self-reported relative income.  In each case, there is a general pattern, 
but there are also many exceptions to this pattern.  Interviewees in the 
poorest quintile or the lower classes (whether defined objectively or 
subjectively) saw themselves as markedly poorer, and interviewees in the 
richest quintile and higher classes as richer.  But there were some 
households in poorer neighbourhoods or lower classes who saw themselves 
as having average or above average income, and some households in richer 
neighbourhoods or higher classes who saw themselves as having below-
average incomes.  This might reflect the reference group.  Although the 
question explicitly asked about incomes relative to ‘other people in South 
Africa’, it is possible that some people assessed their incomes relative to 
people in their neighbourhood or class. 
 


















Self-reported relative income 1     
Household income 0.3125 1    
Neighbourhood income 
quintile 0.2472 0.5761 1   
Occupational class (7-pt scale) -0.3122 -0.5699 -0.4052 1  






Table A2 also reveals a sharp contrast between individuals in the 
intermediate class and those in the core or marginal working classes.  The 
former are markedly less likely to describe themselves as poor or very poor.  
There is an even more striking in Table 10, between the self-reported 
working class and the self-reported lower class. It is unlikely that these 
differences are spurious.  Clearly some people who are ‘objectively’ core or 
marginal working class, by our definition, and who are probably not very 
poor in South African terms, see themselves as lower class and as very poor. 
 
Table 11 reports the results of regressing self-reported relative income on 
household income, neighbourhood income, race, self-reported class and 
occupational class.  The first five models (A to E) treat all variables except 
race as continuous variables.  The last model (Model F) disaggregates the 
two class variables into separate dummy variables for each class or self-
reported class category.  Household income correlates positively and 
significantly with self-reported relative income.  The higher the household’s 
income, the more likely they are to locate themselves towards the rich end of 
the 11-point scale.  Neighbourhood income also correlates positively and 
significantly (see Model B), but the effect disappears when self-reported 
class is added into the model (Model C).  The ‘higher’ a respondent’s self-
reported class (i.e. middle class rather than working class, or working class 
rather than lower class), the richer the respondent considers himself relative 
to other people.  Coloured respondents are significantly less likely to see 
themselves as rich (conditional on household income, neighbourhood 
income and self-reported class), but there is no significant relationship 
between being white and self-reported relative income (Model D).  There is 
a weak relationship between occupational class and self-reported relative 
income (Model E).  Model F shows that there are no significant relationships 
between the disaggregated occupational class categories and self-reported 
relative income, but seeing oneself as ‘middle class’ has a strong effect.4 
                                                 
4 The small cell sizes for each occupational class category reduces the likelihood of 
finding a statistically significant relationship.  If the upper class, semi-professional class 
and intermediate class are combined into one category, the correlation between this 
aggregate category and self-reported relative income approaches statistical significance at 
the 10% level.  
Table 11: Correlates of self-reported relative income (11-point scale) 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F 
Household income (5 categories) 0.48 (0.05) *** 0.41 (0.06) *** 0.29 (0.06) *** 0.29 (0.06) *** 0.2 (0.08) ** 0.22 (0.08) *** 
Neighbourhood income quintile  0.11 (0.52) *** 0.01 (0.05) 0.02 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07)  
Self-reported class (3 categories)   -0.76 (0.09) *** -0.76 (0.1) *** -0.71 (0.12) ***  
Self-reported middle class #      1.51 (0.23) *** 
Self-reported working class #      0.93 (0.22) *** 
Self-reported lower class #      (base) 
Occupational class (7 categories)     -0.08 (0.03) ***  
UC #      0.21 (0.34) 
SPC #      0.2 (0.4) 
IC #      0.1 (0.24) 
CWC #      (base) 
MWC #      0.13 (0.32) 
WE3 #      -0.23 (0.43) 
Unemployed #      -0.37 (0.25) 
African #    (base) (base)  
Coloured #    -0.27 (0.16) * -0.33 (0.2) * -0.35 (0.16) ** 
White #    -0.01 (0.3) -0.06 (0.3)  
Adjusted/pseudo r2 0.09 0.1 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 
N 941 940 917 869 610 610 
Note: Coefficients are unstandardised.  All variables except race are dummy variables in Models A to E.  In Model F, all class variables are dummy 
variables.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Dummy variables are indicated with an #.  Significance shown at * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level.  Data 
are weighted. 
Interviewees were shown the four pictures in Figure 4, and read the 
following:  
 
‘These four pictures show different types of society.  The first 
picture represents a society with a small elite of rich people at the 
top, a few people in the middle, and a large number of poor people 
at the bottom.  The second picture represents a society that is like a 
pyramid, with a small elite at the top, more people in the middle, 
and a lot of poor people at the bottom.  The third picture shows a 
society in which most people are in the middle.  The fourth picture 
shows a society with lots of people at the top, some in the middle, 
and very few at the bottom.  Which of these pictures, in your view, 




 A small elite at the top, a few 
people in the middle and a huge 












Type 2 –  
A society that is like a pyramid, with 
a small elite at the top, more people  
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Type 4 –  
Several people close to the top and 
















Type 2 (the pyramid) attracted the most support, being chosen by 38 percent 
of our respondents, but type 1 (the bipolar distribution) attracted almost as 
much support (30 percent).  Type 3 (the onion) was selected by 19 percent of 
our respondents, with type 4 (the inverted pyramid) being selected by only 
10 percent.  The remaining 3 percent of respondents said that they did not 
know.  There was only a weak relationship between self-placement on the 
rich/poor scale and how respondents saw society, although people who saw 
themselves as rich were less likely to choose the bipolar distribution.5 There 




Class and perceptions of inequality 
 
Having established that interviewees do have some sense of the social 
structure and their places within it, we need to explore whether class or 
neighbourhood income shape perceptions of who is benefiting in the new 
South Africa, and what the government is doing to affect this.  Relevant 
questions in CAS include the following: 
 
About poor people: 
B.11: Would you say that the number of poor people in South Africa today is larger, 
the same or smaller than ten years ago? 
B.12: Do you think that the government is doing too much, enough, or too little for 
poor people in South Africa? 
B.13: Do you think that the number of poor people in South Africa in five years time is 
going to be larger, the same or smaller than it is now? 
 
About rich people: 
B.15: Would you say that the number of rich people in South Africa today is larger, the 
same or smaller than ten years ago? 
B.16: Do you think that the government is doing too much, enough, or too little for rich 
people in South Africa? 
B.17: Do you think that the number of rich people in South Africa in five years time is 
going to be larger, the same or smaller than it is now? 
 
                                                 
5 We had hoped to include an additional question in the survey, asking respondents to 
place themselves on their chosen diagram.  In piloting the questionnaire, however, we 
found that too many respondents were unable or uncomfortable doing this.  So we 





About the interviewee him/herself: 
B.22: Is your overall financial situation today better, the same or worse than it was five 
years ago? 
B.23: Do you expect that your overall financial situation in five years time, in 2010, will 
be better, the same or worse than it is now? 
 
More than two-thirds of the interviewees felt that there were more poor 
people in South Africa in 2005 than there had been ten years before.  There 
were no clear differences according to objective class, subjective class or 
neighbourhood income.  At the same time, more than two-thirds of our 
respondents said that there were more rich people in South Africa in 2005 
than there had been in 1995.  On this question there were some differences 
by subjective class and neighbourhood income, but these were not big 
differences, and there was little difference by objective class.  A higher 
proportion of people in poor neighbourhoods and a lower proportion of 
people in rich neighbourhoods said that the number of rich people had 
grown.  Similarly, a higher proportion of self-reported lower class people 
and a lower proportion of self-reported upper or middle class people said 
this. 
 
With regard to the future, over half of the interviewees felt that there would 
be more poor people in South Africa in 2010 than in 2005.  Almost two-
thirds said that there would be even more rich people in 2010.  Poor people 
were less pessimistic that the numbers of poor people would grow, and more 
optimistic that the numbers of rich would grow.  Unexpectedly, when we 
asked separately whether the numbers of rich ‘African (black)’ and rich 
white people would grow, African interviewees were much more likely to 
say that the numbers of rich white people would grow and much less likely 
to say that the numbers of rich African people would grow.  In other words, 
interviewees tended to think that South Africa would become an even more 
unequal society.  The poor were less pessimistic about the growth of poverty 
but more confident that rich white people would continue to prosper. 
 
Interviewees of all classes concurred that the government was contributing 
to this trend.  About two-thirds of our sample felt that the government was 
not doing enough for poor people, but three-quarters felt that it was doing 
too much or enough for rich people.  People in rich areas were more critical 
of the government’s performance in fighting poverty, but were much less 
likely than people in non-rich areas to say that the government was doing 





More of our interviewees (40 percent) thought that their personal financial 
position had improved over the past five years, than thought it had remained 
the same (31 percent) or deteriorated (25 percent).  There was a weak 
relationship between neighbourhood income and this assessment, but a 
strong relationship between how rich or poor an interviewee though he or 
she was and how they assessed their position had changed.  People who 
thought themselves poor were much more likely to say that their position 
had worsened; people who considered themselves rich were much more 
likely to say it had improved.  It is unclear what causes what, as the direction 
of causality could plausibly run in either direction. 
 
Overall, it is not clear that rich and poor people in Cape Town have very 
different perceptions of who has gained and who has not in the new South 
Africa.  There is a general concern with poverty, although the poor seem less 
anxious than the rich, and are also more impressed with their own changing 
financial situation. The poor are, however, more concerned with the growing 
numbers of rich white people. There is a general concern with the 
government’s performance. The poor are more impressed by what the 
government does for the poor, but are more critical of what it does for the 
rich. 
 
What about grievances?  Asked ‘what is the most important problem facing 
the country that the government should address?’, interviewees in every 
income quintile said ‘job creation’ or ‘unemployment’ far more often than 
any other problem.  Crime was the second most frequently selected problem 
in every quintile.  This is in line with what just about every post-1994 survey 
has found.  But asked about specific services provided by government, 
responses are influenced by class.  Table 12 reports the proportions of 
interviewees in each income quintile who say that they are dissatisfied with 
each of a set of government services.  Whilst discontent with some services 
(clinics, public transport, police) is broad across neighbourhoods, discontent 
with other services (electricity, water, housing, refuse collection) is more 
acute among the poor.  These patterns are mirrored if we analyse responses 






Table 12: Dissatisfaction with government services, by 
neighbourhood income quintile 
Neighbourhood income quintile  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Total 
Electricity 40% 17% 23% 15% 6% 21% 
Water 34% 19% 17% 19% 11% 21% 
Public health clinics or 
hospitals 
56% 60% 60% 52% 47% 55% 
Bus and train services 36% 39% 49% 43% 42% 47% 
Police 38% 38% 55% 38% 28% 39% 
Road repairs and 
construction 
50% 39% 41% 32% 25% 38% 
Housing  69% 54% 58% 48% 36% 53% 
Refuse collection 44% 17% 19% 15% 10% 22% 
Source: CAS 2005, c28-36, weighted data 
 
 
Class, racial identities and attitudes 
 
We have seen that most people readily select a class identity from a list, but 
how important are these class identities relative to other identities, notably 
racial or cultural ones?  As well as asking respondents what class they saw 
themselves as being in, we asked about racial and cultural self-
categorisation.  We then asked which of these three possible identities was 
most important to them. 
 
Over 60 percent of all respondents and of respondents in each major racial 
category said that their cultural identity was the most important to them.  
The most frequently selected cultural identities were Xhosa, South African 
and Christian.  One in five selected their racial identity as being the most 
important (although some chose a racial category as their cultural identity).  
Only about one in six respondents selected their class identity as the most 
important. Overall, objective class seems to make little difference to the 
perceived importance of class identity, although there were some intriguing 
patterns within racial groups.  The coloured upper and semi-professional 
classes were much less attached to class identities than the coloured 
intermediate and core working classes.  Among the African sub-sample, 





their class identity as paramount than those who see themselves as either 
middle or lower class.  The same is not true among coloured people.  Within 
the white sub-sample, self-reported upper or middle class people are most 
likely to say that class identity is important. 
 
The Cape Area Study allows for detailed investigation of how class – and 
self-reported class – correlates with or shapes experiences of and attitudes 
towards racial integration.  Only one variable measuring racial integration 
does correlate closely with class variables: 
 
In the past seven days, have you spent a social evening or some 
free time with friends or acquaintances who are not [the same race 
as you], either at home, going out to eat, or at a community or 
religious gathering? 
 
Self-reported middle and working class respondents were more likely to say 
they had done this than self-reported lower class people.  Respondents in 
upper class, intermediate class and (to a lesser extent) core working class 
occupations were more likely to say they had done this.  But this was not 
true of respondents in semi-professional occupations (i.e. teachers and 
nurses).  Most teachers work in mono-racial schools, so this is perhaps 
unsurprising. 
 
Class variables are of limited importance, either across the whole population 
or within racial groups, with respect to other measures of racial integration.  
The survey asked about the racial mix of the respondent’s five closest 
friends and, if the respondent worked, the five people with whom he or she 
worked most closely.  Class effects here were either weak or non-existent.  
Coloured respondents who identified themselves as working-class were less 
likely than other coloured respondents to say that all of their friends were 
coloured, but the objective class categories were not significant.  Within the 
African population, self-identified middle class respondents were most likely 
to say that all their friends were African (but, again, objective class 
categories were not significant).  (This seemed counter-intuitive at first, but 
perhaps it is related to the predominance of teachers within the African 
middle class in Cape Town).  The only objective class category to correlate 
with the racial mix of friends was the category of ‘unemployed’, which is 
almost certainly a heterogeneous ‘category’ that should be considered as 
multi-class.  But it is noteworthy that, among both coloured and African 





racial sets of friends.  More surprisingly, occupational class seems to make 
no difference to whether respondents report working with racially-mixed 
groups. 
 
Neither the objective nor subjective class variables were significant in 
explaining racial prejudice (although neighbourhood income was). 
 
In Brazil, it is often suggested that there is a relationship between class and 
perceived race, i.e. that people in higher classes see themselves as whiter 
than their ‘objective’ skin colour would suggest. In South Africa, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that some coloured people may have tried or aspired to 
‘pass for white’. (At the same time there are others, including most notably 
the late African National Congress leader, Walter Sisulu, who ‘passed for 
African’!). The more-or-less rigid racial classification system of apartheid 
and the deep linguistic and cultural roots of the ‘racial’ distinction between 
African and white/coloured probably reduce the likelihood of any correlation 
between class and perceived skin colour. The Cape Area Study asked 
respondents to rate their skin colour. There is no significant correlation 






This paper entails a preliminary analysis of survey data on aspects of class in 
contemporary, i.e. post-apartheid, Cape Town.  The ‘findings’ must be 
regarded as especially tentative for two reasons.  First, this paper does not 
draw on any qualitative research.  Secondly, the analysis of objective class is 
still limited to the analysis of individual occupations and takes no account of 
household composition.  Wright explains the importance of including 
‘mediated class positions’ in the analysis of class: 
 
The central point of trying to assign a class location is to clarify 
the nature of the lived experiences and material interests the 
individual is likely to have. Being ‘in’ a class location means that 
you do certain things and certain things happen to you (lived 
experience) and you face certain strategic alternatives for pursuing 
your material well-being (class interests). Jobs embedded within 





linked to such interests and experiences, but not the only way. 
Families provide another set of social relations which tie people to 
the class structure. (Wright, 1997: 523-24). 
 
Elsewhere we included mediated class positions in an analysis of the class 
structure of South Africa (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005), but we have not 
done this yet for the Cape Town data analysed in this paper. 
 
This paper has shown several things.  First, it demonstrates clearly how the 
class structure of Cape Town differs from that of South Africa as a whole.  
Cape Town is a city without much industry.  Two out of three working 
people are in occupations that are classified here as ‘upper class’ 
(managerial and professional), semi-professional (teachers and nurses) or 
intermediate class (white collar, artisans, and so on).  These classes include 
one-third of all respondents in the survey, including the unemployed and 
non-participants in the labour force.  
 
Secondly, there is a clear relationship between race, education and 
occupational class.  White people predominate in upper class occupations, 
coloured people in the range of occupations categorized as semi-
professional, intermediate class or core working class.  African people 
predominate only in the marginal working class (comprising primarily 
domestic workers) and among the unemployed. 
 
The relationship between objective and subjective class was not tidy.  Very 
few people identified themselves as ‘upper class’.  People in occupations 
that we categorise as upper class tended to identify themselves as ‘middle 
class’, and some even identified themselves as ‘working class’.  Our other 
objective class categories all tended to identify themselves as ‘working 
class’, whilst the unemployed tended to identify themselves as ‘lower class’ 
(although about one quarter chose ‘middle class’ and one quarter chose 
‘working class’, indicating the likely heterogeneity of the unemployed).  
Regression analysis suggested that race and some neighbourhood-level 
variables were significant in subjective class categorization. 
 
Most respondents concur that inequality is increasing, with growing 
numbers of poor and rich people at the same time. The rich seem more 
anxious about poverty than the poor, whilst the poor are more impressed by 
the government’s performance in addressing poverty and with their own 





Finally, on whether class affects experiences of or attitudes to racial 
integration, the evidence is mixed.  Further research into this is clearly 
needed. 
 
Overall, this analysis of the Cape Area Study data is preliminary, but 
hopefully provides a basis for further research using the survey data 
themselves, combining them with qualitative research, and comparing them 







Table A1: Neighbourhood income quintile, by self-reported income 














Very poor (0-2) 36 22 18 10 8 19 
Poor (3-4) 19 28 25 28 11 22 
Average (5) 32 39 47 47 42 41 
Above average (6-10) 13 12 10 15 39 39 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: CAS 2005, b7; results are exclusive of ‘don’t know’; n=1,193 
 
Table A2: Individual occupational class, by self-reported income 

















Very poor (0-2) 4 3 8 21 21 40 19 
Poor (3-4) 16 29 22 26 37 22 22 
Average (5) 46 48 52 39 36 26 41 
Above average (6-
10) 
33 20 18 13 15 11 39 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: CAS 2005, b7; results are exclusive of ‘don’t know’; n=1,193 
 
Table A3: Self-reported class, by self-reported income 










Very poor (0-2) 8 13 46 19 
Poor (3-4) 14 29 22 22 
Average (5) 48 45 23 41 
Above average (6-10) 30 13 9 39 
Total 100 100 100 100 
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